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The purpose of this article is to provide a new, more comprehensive stakeholder theory of
the relationships between nonprofit, for-profit, and government sectors. This theory com-
bines aspects of neoclassical economics and principal-agency theory to complement the
traditional notions that these organizations either compete or exist in a vacuum relative
to one another. The article discusses nonprofit organizations that are employee groups
(unions and professional associations), shareholders (institutional investors including
pension funds and endowments), community and other interest groups, government
contractors, competitors, consumers, and suppliers. By viewing these organizations as
agents relative to a principal for-profit (or government) organization, it is possible to
hypothesize about relationships and behaviors between organizations of different sectors
of the economy. This new perspective allows a better understanding of the many relation-
ships observed in the nonprofit sector and of a much greater range of nonprofit stakehold-
ers than is currently possible given existing theory.
Traditional macrostructural studies of organizations have examined a focal or
central organization in relation to other organized identities. This article maps
out some of the many relationships that bring nonprofit organizations into the
focal orbit of business (for-profit organizations), government, or other non-
profit organizations. By examining these relationships in the context of organ-
izational and economic theories, we are able to derive a new, more compre-
hensive stakeholder theory of the relationships between nonprofit, for-profit,
and government sectors.
At first glance, some of the forms and forces that bring nonprofit organiza-
tions into the focal orbit of other organizations may seem irrational from an
internal (neoclassical theory of the firm) perspective. For example, it is not
readily apparent why a corporation supports the activities of a local nonprofit
that provides legal services for the elderly. Such actions, however, may be
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4, December 1999 416-431
© 1999 Sage Publications, Inc.
416
explained by a variety of theories. Among them are institutional isomorphic
forces (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer & Scott, 1983), competitive
forces (e.g., Porter, 1980, 1991), population forces (e.g., Hannan & Freeman,
1977, 1989), and dependency forces (e.g., Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Zald, 1967, 1969). A recent addition to the explanatory theories at the
interorganizational level is the stakeholder perspective, which seeks to bring
many of the forces and organizational types together.
This article begins with a general discussion of the theoretical (bilateral)
relationship between nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Although the
bilateral relationship fits into a larger network of interaction between organi-
zations, we begin with the more simplified case of the forces that exist between
these two types of organizations. The case we present may be extended to
explore other bilateral relationships between organizations. We examine
theories that explain organizational behavior from economics, management,
and nonprofit literature, tracing the evolution of the nonprofit–for-profit rela-
tionship from a competition model to that of a coexistent or collaborative
model. By enumerating different types of bilateral relationships, we form a
more general stakeholder perspective. This perspective allows us to extend
traditional stakeholder theory to fit the many relationships observed in the
nonprofit sector better, and to build on this new model to embody a much
greater range of nonprofit stakeholders. Finally, we discuss the implications
(at both the organizational and interorganizational level) of an organization’s
stakeholders being nonprofit organizations. We develop hypotheses that
address the potential for opportunity or threat in nonprofit–for-profit stake-
holder relationships.
ECONOMIC THEORY: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Economists study the efficient allocation of scarce resources under condi-
tions of uncertainty. In particular, economic theories address how markets,
governments, and voluntary institutions or other nonmarket institutions
(direct altruism, crime, families, and informal groups) function, and how vari-
ous mechanisms for allocating resources (prices, motivations, etc.) work in
different situations, industries, and economies.
With regard to nonprofit–for-profit relationships, economists have gener-
ally suggested that nonprofit and for-profit organizations occupy different
market segments within industries. Because productive and allocative effi-
ciency are important to economists, many economic studies have focused on
competitive relationships between commercial nonprofit organizations
(Hansmann, 1980) and small business (e.g., Eckel & Steinberg, 1993; Schiff &
Weisbrod, 1991; Steinberg, 1991).
Perhaps in contrast to the worries expressed in earlier economic studies,
much of the interaction between nonprofit and for-profit organizations prob-
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ably is not directly competitive. In the United States in recent years, nonprofit
organizations derived about half their income, on average, from fees and ser-
vice charges (excluding government reimbursements). Relatively little of this
revenue came from commercially competitive ventures not directly related
to the missions of the nonprofit organizations. Competitive interactions can
be observed in hospital, nursing home, and day-care industries (Young & Ste-
inberg, 1995), where nonprofit organizations appear to provide essentially the
same services and compete for the same paying customers as for-profit
organizations.
More recently, economists and other researchers have begun exploring the
potential for (or actual) coexistence and collaboration of organizations across
sectors. Young and Steinberg (1995) suggest that, in addition to competition,
nonprofit organizations interact with other entities in the economy in many
ways. For example, nonprofit organizations may
• act as contractual agents for government, delivering public services for
which government pays;
• contract with business to provide services such as mental health care for
corporate employees;
• form partnerships with business and government in areas such as urban
development and biotechnology research;
• form for-profit subsidiaries to separate commercial activity from
mission-related activity;
• be established by businesses as corporate foundations and nonprofit
trade associations;
• be regulated by government in various ways;
• operate fundraising campaigns and payroll deduction plans within gov-
ernment agencies and corporations;
• and have corporate and government executives involved as volunteers
and board members of the nonprofit organization. (Governments may
also appoint board members to some nonprofit organizations in which
they have a major interest.)
According to Young and Steinberg (1995), the presence of mixed industries
suggests that nonprofit organizations either complement or compete with
other kinds of organizations in the provision of particular kinds of goods and
services. Weisbrod (1988) presents evidence that nonprofit organizations may
offer subtly different varieties of service than do for-profit organizations. Such
analyses, although starting with the assumption of competition between or-
ganizations, subtly shift the dynamics of the nonprofit–for-profit relationship
from competition to coexistence. Because nonprofit and for-profit organiza-
tions may occupy different niches within a given industry rather than com-
pete head-to-head, a coexistent relationship may become complementary. For
example, complementary positions in a market can result from contract fail-
ure. If poorly informed consumers prefer to patronize nonprofit organizations
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and better informed consumers feel that they can obtain services closer to their
preferences from for-profit organizations, these two organizations comple-
ment each other. The arrangement is efficient; all consumers find their pre-
ferred service alternatives and put their resources to their most highly valued
uses. The complementarity thesis paves the way for an understanding with
greater nuances of the different conditions under which nonprofit and for-
profit organizations interact. It is to these more subtle explanations that we
now turn.
In the following sections, we review the central tenets of the stakeholder
perspective from management theory. Combining the economic theories of
competition with stakeholder theory, we develop an argument of the value of
a modified stakeholder perspective to align extant interorganizational theo-
ries. Building on these arguments, we look at nonprofit–for-profit contractual
or collaborative relationships from a stakeholder-network perspective.
MANAGEMENT THEORY AND
THE STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE
The stakeholder perspective arose as a way to make sense of the turbulent
changes affecting business in the 1980s (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair,
1991). Savage et al. (1991) suggested that a new theory could explain the
impact of directors, employees, and communities, among others, demanding
a voice in the way corporations are run. Freeman (1984), an early proponent of
stakeholder theory, contributed the idea that managers must satisfy many dif-
ferent constituents in effectively administering a business. Freeman and Reed
(1983) identified stakeholders as the groups on whose support the corporation
depends. Although stakeholder theory maintains stockholders as principals,
they become only one among a host of varied principals or stakeholders of the
firm. This allows managers to legitimately concentrate on maintaining
outside-organizational relationships without necessarily accounting to share-
holders in all instances. More recently, Barnett (1997) outlined stakeholding as
good long-term decision making by the firm (investments, disinvestments,
etc.) that tries to identify with all the interests and individuals affected by the
decisions. Of course, stakeholder management turns out to be much more dif-
ficult in practice than in theory, as evidenced by Daft’s (1998) cautions that sat-
isfying some stakeholders may lead to the alienation of others.
These studies, along with those by several economists, have proposed
thinking about stakeholders as principals involved in multiagency relation-
ships with a core management or target corporation (A. Slivinski and R. Stein-
berg, personal communication, 1996). It is very likely that many, if not most,
bilateral (nonprofit–for-profit) stakeholder relationships can be modeled as
principal-multiagent relationships. Agency theory often assumes that the
interests of principal(s) and agent(s) differ and lead to agency costs of moni-
toring and compliance. Use of a stakeholder perspective rather than an agency
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perspective allows us to loosen the assumption of necessary conflict of interest
between parties due to competition.
STAKEHOLDER THEORY AS SYNTHESIS
OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT THEORIES
Although stakeholder theory has traditionally been used to explore
principal-agent problems between for-profit organizations and stockholders,
the theory is more flexible. As we show in Figure 1, there are many more stake-
holder organizations than just stockholders. This section discusses the exten-
sion of stakeholder theory from a singular bilateral relationship to multiple
bilateral relationships. (Note that we could use network language to describe
a set of organizations and their respective stakeholders. We have chosen to
focus only on one node and the bilateral relationships that result; however, the
theory could be extended to a network analysis of relationships among
organizations.)
Rowley (1997) begins the move away from a singular bilateral relationship
using social network analysis to construct a multiorganizational relational
space around a central, or focal, organization. We suggest that social network
theory is only one complement to stakeholder theory, and that by subsuming
other macrostructural organizational theories, stakeholder theory can help to
explain a wider range of interorganizational behavior. In particular, we sug-
gest that institutional forces between a focal organization and like organiza-
tions may help to explain isomorphic behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
among stakeholders. Similarly, ecological or competitive forces (Hannan &
Freeman, 1984, 1989) can characterize stakeholder relations and be used to
understand relative positions in stakeholder networks or universes. The
dependency language of stakeholder theory is consonant with resource
dependence models of interorganizational relations (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). In this way, we can think about stakeholder theory as an encompass-
ing (macro) theory that helps to bring institutional, competitive, and
dependence forces—and competitive forces—into a unified theory. The next




The literature of the nonprofit sector contains a seminal work that places
nonprofit organizations in the center of multiple bilateral relationships with
stakeholder groups. In 1991, Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen used stakeholder
concepts to theorize that nonprofit organizations are founded and controlled
primarily by “demand-side stakeholders” interested in the provision of some
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services for themselves as consumers and/or for the benefit of others, as
donors or sponsors. (This contrasts with for-profit firms, which are founded
and controlled by suppliers of capital who are interested in returns to their
investment rather than in the product as such.) High-demand stakeholders
(who have the greatest interest in the organizations’ products, and who have
the time, expertise, and so on to engage in controlling them) control nonprofit
organizations in this context. The willingness of high-demand stakeholders to
engage in these functions is enhanced by their belonging to common groups
and networks that exercise social pressure against free riders, as well as pro-
viding help with the provision of startup capital and other inputs.
High-demand stakeholders prefer nonprofit organizations in one of the
two following situations: where for-profit organizations fail to provide prod-
ucts and services that stakeholders trust; and where they provide insufficient
quantity or quality, and government provision fails to compensate for this
market failure. Such market and government supply failures may occur in the
provision of nonrival goods that are difficult for stakeholders to evaluate
(trust goods). Failures also occur in provision of public, charitable, and certain
mixed goods, in which high-demand stakeholders may be quantity or quality
constrained. That is, failures occur when fixed quantities or qualities of goods
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Figure 1. Stakeholder Theory of the Firm
Source: Brenner and Cochran (1991), adapted from Mitroff (1983).
or services are provided to all citizens by public agencies or nonprofit organi-
zations, and consumers cannot choose how much they obtain individually.
For Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1991), the stakeholder concept is useful
in explaining nonprofit organizational behavior in which nonprofit organiza-
tions are centered in the analysis. In the next section, we build on this work by
centering for-profit or governmental organizations and then asking about
their relationships with organized nonprofit stakeholders.
THE NONPROFIT STAKEHOLDER ARRAY
In this section, we discuss what a broader stakeholder perspective implies
for the behavior of for-profit and nonprofit organizations. We then discuss the
types of relationships that make up the array of interactions between corpora-
tions and nonprofit organizations.
First, nonprofit organizations are entities on which corporations depend
for various tangible and intangible resources (and vice versa). The role and
behavior of nonprofit organizations (as agents) may be seen as similar to man-
agement’s role and behavior in relating to corporate owners (as principals).
Although corporate owners are concerned with profit maximization, manag-
ers (as agents) may have their own agendas. Principal-agency problems arise
from the need for corporate owners to monitor and evaluate the actions of
managers. Similarly, in situations when for-profit organizations engage in
cause-related marketing or reputation enhancement because of their dealings
with nonprofit organizations, the for-profit principal has a great interest in
monitoring the actions of the agent nonprofit (e.g., see articles on corporate
goodwill, Webb, 1996; Webb & Farmer, 1996).
Second, nonprofit organizations may represent opportunities or threats for
corporate management (Savage et al., 1991). As such, managers of for-profit
organizations may behave either in ways that increase their involvement or
collaboration with corporations or defensively. This hypothesis allows for a
broader range of behavior between nonprofit and for-profit organizations,
and allows researchers a more exhaustive tool for understanding the great
complexity and new forms open to relationships among organizations in both
sectors.
Finally, as we move to a stakeholder perspective, nonprofit organizations
move from secondary (supporting or, perhaps, supported) roles in for-profit
agendas to central roles in collaborations, partnerships, or out-and-out com-
petitions. Nonprofits may be viewed not only as a repository, but also as a pro-
active ally. Alternatively, perhaps they may be viewed as a threat. Savage et al.
(1991) present a useful matrix for understanding the types and strategies that
focal organization may visualize in managing their relationships with non-
profit stakeholders. This matrix is shown in Figure 2.
In an ideal case, the nonprofit stakeholder supports the for-profit organiza-
tion’s goals and actions. This type of nonprofit organization presents a low
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threat, and it is a likely candidate to cooperate with the for-profit organization.
Examples of such types of organizations may include management groups,
employee groups, service providers, and community organizations. For-
profit organizations may find success in cooperating with the stakeholder
nonprofit by involving the nonprofit in relevant issues for both organizations.
Marginal stakeholder nonprofits are neither especially interested in coop-
eration nor highly threatening. Although they potentially have a stake in
organizational issues, they generally are not concerned about most decisions
made by the for-profit organization. This type of nonprofit group may include
consumer interest groups and professional associations for employees. Of
course, certain issues could activate a group to change their status to either
cooperative or threatening (e.g., work-place safety issues or product safety).
Forward-thinking management of the for-profit organization can best be
accomplished by monitoring the nonprofit stakeholder, paying attention to
the specific issues of concern to the members of the nonprofit organization.
A more difficult type of relationship exists between organizations that may
be characterized as nonsupportive and competitive, or threatening. Compet-
ing organizations, employee unions, the federal (and possibly state or local)
government, and the media may be both noncooperative and potentially
threatening to a for-profit organization. The key to managing the relationship
is for the for-profit managers to prepare a good defense. The defense strategy
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Figure 2. Types and Strategies of Stakeholders
Source: Adapted from Savage, Nix, Whitehead, and Blair (1991).
tries to find the basis for the stakeholders’ interest in the organization, and to
reduce the dependence of the nonprofit on that basis. Of course, it is in the
interest of the for-profit organization to try to cultivate a better relationship
with these types of stakeholder organizations.
Finally, some organizations may be characterized as potentially very
threatening or very cooperative. For example, institutional investors, com-
petitors, suppliers, powerful employee unions, and the like, may be friends or
foes in the attainment of the firm’s goals and objectives. Collaboration is an
obvious management strategy to try to convert a potential threat into an ally.
Savage et al. (1991) note that joint ventures, mergers, and other forms of col-
laboration may result in a successful outcome for the business, and potentially
for the stakeholder nonprofits as well.
In sum, the multiagency stakeholder view allows us to explore new rela-
tionships between organizations of the sectors that the neoclassical economist
and the agency theorists could not have anticipated. It stands as a tool that
for-profit managers can use in capitalizing on the potential that nonprofit
organizations promise.
In the following paragraphs, we form a partial list of stakeholder groups
and build on this list to suggest changes in the organization and behavior of
nonprofit and for-profit organizations resulting from their collaborations,
coexistence, or competition.
NONPROFIT STAKEHOLDER
GROUPS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
We can find nonprofit organizations in almost any stakeholder role imagin-
able. In fact, when individual stakeholders come to be organized (often spe-
cifically to contend with some aspect of the business of the focal organization),
they are likely to adopt a nonprofit form. (We note, however, that these
organizations generally adopt the nonprofit form because of the advantages,
tax and otherwise, offered by this form.) We suggest an enhancement of Fig-
ure 1, which results in a better characterization of the relationships between
nonprofit organizations and the focal for-profit organization. Figure 3 identi-
fies organizations usually incorporated as nonprofits to play each of Figure 1’s
stakeholder roles. This visual should help to guide the hypothesis generation
following the description of the stakeholder groups.
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: COMMUNITY
One of the most visible nonprofit stakeholder roles is that of community
watchdog or interest group. Many organizations (corporate and otherwise), at
times, find themselves running afoul of some organized community-interest
group, whether it is an environmental organization, a certification
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association, or an advocacy group (almost all of which are organized as non-
profits). Examples of the way that nonprofit community-interest groups inter-
act with focal for-profit corporations include encounters ranging from Alaska
Public Interest Research Group’s (AKPIRG) letter-writing campaign to legis-
lators urging them to demand payment from Exxon for punitive damages
(www. akpirg.org, 1999) to the Colorado Environmental Coalition’s tangling
with metro Denver for-profit developers on the issues of limiting urban
sprawl (www.igc.apc.org/pirg/copirg/enviro/sprawl, 1999).
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: COMPETITOR
Although it is not an issue in many industries, competition from tax-
exempt nonprofit organizations is still a perception, if not a reality, for some
portions of the corporate universe. Anyone who has chosen between goods
and services from a YMCA and Crunch Gym, or The Museum Shop and the
Metropolitan Museum of Art Store, or Humana Hospital Corporation and
Beth Israel Hospital is aware of the potential for nonprofits to exist in competi-
tive relations with for-profit organizations. (More on this case may be found in
the economics literature cited previously.)
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Figure 3. Expanded Stakeholder Theory of a Focal Organization
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: CUSTOMERS
Nonprofit organizations themselves, and in consortia or association (like
many other organizations), apply pressure to corporations and other focal
organizations as customers or clients. In fact, in organized consortia, nonprof-
its have the ability to impose greater stakeholder demands on organizations.
For example, nonprofit organizations, singly and in groups, purchase whole
ranges of goods and services and bring a much sought-after legitimacy to their
role as educated consumers. The Nonprofit Coordinating Committee in New
York City, a consortium of more than 800 nonprofits offers its members dis-
counts on legal services, purchase of D&O insurance, and even office supplies
from Staples.
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS
When employees organize into unions or professional associations, they
almost exclusively choose the nonprofit form to leverage their organizational
stake. Again, when individuals organize themselves into a more powerful
organizational stakeholder group, it is directly through the nonprofit form
that they gain bargaining advantage with focal organizations. Any manufac-
turing concern that has bargained with the Teamsters; American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); 1199; Service
Employees International Union (SEIU); and so forth knows the power of the
nonprofit union. Likewise, any educational institution that has haggled with
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) or the American
Federation  of  Teachers  (AFT)  understands  the  potency  of  the  nonprofit
employees association.
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: GOVERNMENT
With the accelerated reinvention of government and strengthening third-
party government system, nonprofits are finding their way into the middle of
corporate-government relationships (e.g., Salamon, 1987). Nonprofit organi-
zations, working as government contractors, are often in positions to make
demands or enter collaborations with focal for-profit organizations. Cer-
tainly, focal organizations (pharmaceutical concerns, medical supply compa-
nies, etc.) that interact with Medicare and Medicaid know the power of the
nonprofit hospital or nonprofit health maintenance organization (HMO)
intermediary.
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: STOCKHOLDERS
Whether it is through the advancement of pension-fund capitalism
(Drucker, 1993) or the increasingly active management of university, founda-
tion, and other large nonprofit endowments, nonprofit organizations are
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increasingly found in the stakeholder role of owner of corporate stock. Non-
profit pension funds alone are worth about $2.8 trillion (Moberg, 1998). These
funds own about one eighth of all corporate stock (Moberg, 1998), making the
nonprofit shareholder a crucial organizational stakeholder. Nonprofit higher
educational institutions account for billions of dollars of endowment invest-
ments, and institutional and individual shareholders (through, for example,
The Council of Institutional Investors and the American Association of Indi-
vidual Investors, respectively) have organized into nonprofit groups to better
leverage their stockowner’s voice.
STAKEHOLDER GROUP: SUPPLIERS
Although they are perhaps less involved in the supply of raw materials and
goods to other organizations (for-profit and not), nonprofit organizations
supply services to business through contracting and other arrangements. Cer-
tainly, medical and educational services immediately come to mind whether
the supplier arrangement is a financial contract, a spot transaction, or a tuition
remission. Furthermore, nonprofit organizations involved in facilitating
welfare-to-work reform find themselves in the role of supplier of labor. New
York City’s nonprofit Wildcat’s provision of work-ready welfare mothers to
Salomon-Smith Barney is one notable example.
WHAT DO NONPROFIT STAKEHOLDERS
IMPLY FOR CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND BEHAVIOR
AMONG NONPROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS?
Now that we have identified nonprofit organizations in stakeholder roles,
what can we say about changes in the organization and behavior of nonprofit
and for-profit organizations resulting from their collaborations, coexistence,
or competition? Giddens (1981) introduces the concept of structuration, or
forces between organizations that explain how organizations are structured
or behave to structure other organizations. The character, urgency, length,
and so forth of the relationships between a focal (for-profit or government)
organization and its nonprofit stakeholders may be used to illuminate struc-
turating forces between organizations.
Specifically, we suggest that understanding the stakeholder relationship
between nonprofit organizations and focal organizations goes a long way in
helping us to understand how nonprofit organizations come to be structured
(or come to structure other organizations). The structuration process suggests
predicted behaviors and actions, as well as future organizational courses. An
organization’s ability to threaten or cooperate with another organization
helps to determine the strategy that each organization’s management takes
with the other. Drawing on macrostructural theories and the enhanced stake-
holder theory derived above, we suggest testable hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 1: If a nonprofit is a stockholder in a for-profit corporation, we
might expect power and dependence forces to characterize a principal-
agent relationship between the nonprofit and the focal organization. In
this case, the nonprofit organization may be able to affect structural con-
straints on (or at least threaten) the focal organization. For example, if a
large union operates a pension fund, the companies whose stock is held
by the fund may be affected by desires of the stakeholders in the pension
fund. The larger the holdings of the pension fund, the more power the
stakeholders wield in affecting the corporation.
Hypothesis 2: If a stakeholder is a nonprofit organization in competition
with the for-profit organization, we might expect institutional (mimetic)
and competitive forces to result in structural isomorphism. Structural
isomorphism means that the nonprofit stakeholder comes to resemble
the focal organization and, perhaps, the focal organization begins to re-
semble the nonprofit organization. Furthermore, the greater the power
of the nonprofit competitor, the greater is the likelihood of threat to the
for-profit organization.
Hypothesis 3: If the nonprofit stakeholder is a contractor to a government
agency, we may expect coercive (institutional) forces to dictate a structu-
ration negotiation between the nonprofit and the focal organization.
With increased size and power, the nonprofit organization’s claim to ne-
gotiation may become a claim to power, and, consequently, its ability to
threaten a focal organization will be great.
Hypothesis 4: If employees or managers organize to become a stakeholder
group, we may expect that either coercive or normative institutional
forces will dictate a structuration negotiation between the nonprofit and
the focal organization. With increased size and power, the nonprofit
organization’s claim to negotiation may become a claim to power. This
power could enhance a union’s ability to threaten and an employee asso-
ciation’s ability to cooperate.
Hypothesis 5: If a community stakeholder is a nonprofit, then we may expect
that legitimacy (institutional) forces will dictate a structuration negotia-
tion between the nonprofit and the focal organization. With increased
size and power, the nonprofit organization’s claim to negotiation may
become a claim to power, and, consequently, its ability to threaten a focal
organization will be great.
Hypothesis 6: If a customer group organizes as a nonprofit stakeholder, we
may expect that legitimacy (institutional) forces will dictate a structura-
tion negotiation between the nonprofit and the focal organization. With
increased size and power, the nonprofit organization’s claim to negotia-
tion may become a claim to power, and, consequently, its ability to
threaten and/or cooperate with a focal organization will be great.
Hypothesis 7: If a group of long-term suppliers organizes as a nonprofit
stakeholder, we might expect power and dependence forces to charac-
terize a hierarchical relationship such that the focal organization dictates
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the nonprofit structure. For a large or powerful nonprofit supplier
group, the ability to threaten or cooperate with a focal organization will
be great.
DISCUSSION
The preceding hypotheses are intended to serve as an impetus for further
study of the bilateral (and for an ambitious researcher, network) relationships
between (and among) focal organizations and their nonprofit stakeholders.
Certainly, when aggregated as organizational stakeholders, nonprofit organi-
zations play a much larger and more important role in the economic, social,
and political arenas than is often accorded to them. How important this role is
depends on the potential for organizations to collaborate with or threaten one
another, as well as the ability of individuals to unite to interact better with the
focal organization. Case studies of particular for-profit and government
organizations and their management of nonprofit stakeholders would be par-
ticularly welcome as a next step in this research agenda. Large-scale organiza-
tional and industry studies of the power of nonprofit stakeholders would be a
great help in understanding the structurating forces that nonprofit organiza-
tions come to impose on focal organizations (and vice versa).
Comparative industry and organizational studies would be particularly
welcome, as only they can address the issue of the interaction effects of owner-
ship and external influences (Schlesinger, 1998). As Schlesinger suggests,
external influences (stakeholders’ impact, in our case) may vary significantly
from one industry to another, by geography or over time. The stakeholder
model that we have suggested trades off explanatory description (stasis) for
dynamism. A model with greater nuance would acknowledge great fluctua-
tions in institutional, competitive, and power dependence forces between
bilateral stakeholders over time and across organizations.
As a starting point, this research provides a newer, more comprehensive
theory of the relationships between nonprofit, for-profit, and government sec-
tors to expand the traditional notions that nonprofit and for-profit organiza-
tions either compete or exist in a vacuum relative to one another. We have pro-
posed a theory that should allow for many different kinds and strengths of
relationships between focal organizations and their stakeholders. As such, we
expect that we have brought further complexity (and, perhaps, reality) to our
collective understanding of the roles that nonprofit organizations play in all
types of industries and economies.
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